M. GOPINATH REDDY

Large-scale development activities involve displacement of populations on a massive scale. Most often, such displacement is involuntary. In this process of displacement, many villages and their socio-economic structures are destroyed. Further, involuntary displacement disturbs and at times completely dismantles the production base, inducing impoverishment among affected populations. Sometimes, the magnitude of displacement is so massive that regional economies are adversely affected.

It is by now well established that by its very nature, involuntary displacement is a disruptive and painful process. Economically and culturally, it creates a high risk of chronic impoverishment that typically occurs along one or several of the following dimensions: landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, mortality, and social disarticulation (Cernea, 1990). This paper attempts to delineate the experience of Singoor project in Andhra Pradesh with regard to displacement effects, compensation policy, and finally resettlement and rehabilitation packages for the project-affected persons.

Section – I: The Singoor Project

Salient features: The Singoor Project was constructed across the river Manjira, a tributary of the river Godavari, near Singoor Village in Medak District of Andhra Pradesh. The reservoir is located at about 150 kms upstream of the Manjira Barrage near Sangareddy, the headquarters of Medak District. The Singoor reservoir was formed by constructing an earthen dam 7180 M on either side of the river with a masonry spillway of 340 M. The spillway has been designed for maximum flood discharge of 780,000 cusecs.

The maximum height of the dam above foundation level is 33.5 M. The reservoir has a gross storage capacity of 30 TMC of FRL + 532.60 M with a total water spread of 164.43 sq. kms. The catchment area of the project from Andhra Pradesh is about 700 sq. kms. 30 TMC of reservoir capacity is meant for:

• Providing 4 TMC (62.5 mgd) of additional water supply to the twin-cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad.
• Regulated release in the downstream river to stabilize the existing irrigation system, including the Nizamsagar Project.
• Arresting silting in the Manjira river flowing down the Nizamsagar reservoir.
• Power generation of 20 MW (3 units).

In addition, land to the extent of 2841 acres in 17 villages and two bridges in Karnataka have been submerged. No village settlement in Karnataka has been fully submerged. Our analysis is, however, confined to submerged land and structures in fully submerged villages of Andhra Pradesh.
 
 

Main characteristics of the submerged area: 69 villages have been affected by the Singoor Project. Out of these, 27 villages have been fully submerged and the other 42 have been partially submerged. The total population of the fully submerged 27 villages is 23540. The fully submerged villages can be characterized as follows:

• The affected areas are backward in terms of agricultural growth and by other sectoral development indicators.
• Most of the area depends on rain fed crops. A small proportion of the area has assured irrigation.
• Yields are very low. Modern methods of cultivation are not adopted.
• Jowar is the staple food of the area. Only some of the households use rice as staple food.
• Fertile black cotton soil in the area is not fully exploited due to lack of sufficient water.

The infrastructure possessed by the submerged villages is as follows:

• 26 primary, 2 secondary, 2 high schools and 3 adult education centres.
• Distance to be covered in order to get medical attention is up to 5 kms in 8 villages, 5 – 10 kms in 7 villages and above 10 kms in 8 villages. These villages had access to one hospital and one registered medical practitioner.
• Potable water was available through wells in 26 villages, tube wells in 3 villages and hand pumps in 6 villages.
• Post and telegraph facilities were available within the village in 8 villages, within a distance of 1 km for 11 villages and within 5 – 10 kms for 7 villages.
• Bus facility was available within the village for 4 villages, within a distance of 1 – 5 kms for 7 villages, within 5 – 10 kms for 8 villages and above 10 kms for 7 villages.
• 5 villages had pucca roads, 16 had kutcha roads while 5 villages could only be accessed by foot.
• Electricity was available for domestic purposes in 4 villages and in 2 villages for agricultural purposes.
• These villages had access to 1 commercial bank, 1 cooperative bank, 1 veterinary hospital and 24 fair price shops.

Category	Illiterates	Primary	Others	Total
Large farmers	59.8	20.5	19.5	100.0
Medium farmers	75.2	14.2	10.0	100.0
Small farmers	84.0	11.8	4.2	100.0
Marginal farmers	91.1	0.6	8.3	100.0
Agricultural labor	93.5	3.2	3.3	100.0
Others	71.4	28.6	-	100.0
Total	76.5	13.6	9.9	100.0

As high as 87.5% of the graduates are engaged in unskilled activity. This reflects the level of unemployment in the area. There is hardly any scope for a large number of educated youth residing in these affected villages (Table – 7).

Level of education	Unskilled		Skilled		Total
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Illiterate	540	96.8	18	3.2	558	100.0
Primary	91	91.9	8	8.1	99	100.0
Secondary	22	100.0	0	0.0	22	100.0
High school	35	94.6	2	5.4	37	100.0
Intermediate	5	100.0	0	0.0	5	100.0
Degree	7	87.5	1	12.1	8	100.0

The households in the entire project area are dependent on agriculture for their income, as there are no large or small-scale industries in the area. There is hardly any income derived from livestock or household industry. The average income derived by agricultural labor is the highest at Rs. 4990 per household. Further, the average household income in the others category is higher than the average income of the marginal farmers (Table – 8).

Category	Agriculture	Hired out labor	Other incomes	Total cost	Net income
Large farmers	20093	1163	14	4365	16905
Medium farmers	10572	2140	13	2073	10651
Small farmers	4477	2326	10	1099	5714
Marginal farmers	4788	1881	19	1185	5503
Average	10862	1912	14	2373	10415

55.3% of the households are engaged in cultivation whereas 5.1% of the households do not have any activity at all. The percentage of cultivators is expected to go down from 55.3% at present to 24.6% after evacuation. On the other hand, the percentage of households with no activity will increase from 5.1% at present to 33.9% after evacuation. However, the percentage of labor is expected to be more or less the same as before. Thus, a shift in occupational pattern is expected to take place from cultivation to no activity. This would have a negative impact on the employment situation in the area (Tables – 9 and 10). The affected area, thus, is backward in terms of both physical and human resources.

Category	Cultivators		Labor		No activity		Others		Total
	No.	%age	No.	%age	No.	%age	No.	%age	No.	%age
Large farmers	195	85.2	13	5.7	13	5.7	8	3.4	229	100.0
Medium farmers	108	72.0	29	19.5	7	4.7	5	3.3	149	100.0
Small farmers	62	43.1	54	37.5	5	3.5	23	15.9	144	100.0
Marginal farmers	37	21.9	101	59.8	10	5.9	21	12.4	169	100.0
Agricultural labor	-	-	27	87.1	1	3.2	3	9.7	31	100.0
Others	1	14.3	2	28.6	1	14.3	3	42.8	7	100.0
Total	403	55.3	226	31.0	1	5.1	3	8.6	7	100.0

Category	Cultivators	Labor	No activity	Others	Total
Large farmers	21	2	3	1	27
Medium farmers	6	6	2	--	14
Small farmers	4	16	1	6	27
Marginal farmers	5	14	2	5	26
Agricultural labor	--	2	--	--	2
Others	--	1	--	--	1
Total	36	41	8	12	97

Consequences of displacement: The consequences of displacement under the Singoor Project area are presented below:

• The land base of the villages has been drastically reduced due to submergence. Common property resources (grazing lands and tanks have completely vanished). There are no government lands that can be brought under cultivation. The erstwhile large and medium farmers have left the villages taking with them considerable compensation. As a result, the scope for private investment in agriculture has disappeared. Agriculture continued to be in a state of subsistence in the villages.
• Landlessness and idleness in households has increased.
• Farmers used to raise crops in two seasons (Kharif and Rabi), as some of the lands were fertile. Since these lands have been submerged, the scope for raising crops in the second season has declined.
• The loss of common property resources due to submergence has led to dwindling of livestock holding of the people.
• The shrinkage of land base has induced a number of households to migrate, although most of the villages under the Singoor Project have remained intact and rehabilitated in the vicinity. Large farmers who received large compensation were able to purchase land and other assets in villages, semi-urban and urban areas. For them, displacement did not cause much hardship. In fact, for some of them it was unexpected gain. But for a large majority, mostly poor, displacement proved very costly as they were forced to eke out their livelihood in places where they had no roots.
• The reduction in the production base of agriculture and allied activities has severely affected village labor markets. Wage employment opportunities, which were available in abundance prior to submergence, are no more available for landless labor.
• The exit of small and large farmers has disturbed patron-client and jajmani relations severely. This, in turn, has led to a considerable decline in sources of informal credit for small and marginal farmers and landless labor. Rural artisans, who hitherto provided services to their patrons, have been reduced to a pathetic state. Most of them have joined the ranks of agricultural labor.
• In few villages it was observed that the village sarpanch/president had migrated from their villages on account of submergence. The political vacuum created by the exit of village leaders created immense hardships for project affected families who remained in the new settlements because there was nobody to represent their grievances to appropriate authorities.

The policy: During the last three decades, many changes have taken place in the rehabilitation policy followed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh. Under earlier projects like Nagarjunasagar and Pochampad, physical rehabilitation policy has been followed. In case of the Singoor Project, no provision has been made for physical rehabilitation. Instead, cash grant compensation policy has been adopted. Project affected persons are paid compensation for lands and structures that have been affected. However, a provision has been made to pay some rehabilitation grant on the basis of existing laws to the affected persons.

The Government of Andhra Pradesh issued orders that no rehabilitation centres will be set-up by the government under project hereafter. Ex-gratia cash grant will be paid to the displaced families in lieu of rehabilitation in all major and medium irrigation and hydroelectric projects excepting the projects where orders have been issued to set-up rehabilitation centres. The ex-gratia cash grant to be paid in lieu of rehabilitation should be at the following rate:

• Those whose lands are affected will be paid an ex-gratia of either 50% of compensation decided or Rs. 1000, whichever is minimum.
• Those whose houses are affected will be paid an ex-gratia of either 50% of compensation decided or Rs. 5000, whichever is minimum.

• An additional amount at the rate of 12% per annum on the market value from the date of the notification till the date of taking possession or award, as the case may be.
• A solatium at the rate of 30% on the market value fixed is to be paid.

• Thatched huts.
• Tiled roof houses.
• Terrace houses.

Cash grant compensation policy and its contribution to the resettlement of project affected families: The contribution of cash grant compensation policy has been assessed based on the following issues:

• Whether the compensation received by the project affected families is adequate to construct the structures to reside and purchase agricultural lands to make a living.
• Whether the project-affected families have invested the whole compensation to construct and purchase lands.
• Whether the project-affected families themselves resettle as village, cohesive and family units.

The data reveals that the average compensation received per household works out to Rs. 11089 for the entire fully submerged area, although there are differences in the average compensation for different categories of households. The average compensation received by large farmers is Rs. 15364, whereas that received by agricultural labor is Rs. 4190. The average compensation paid per acre of dry land is Rs. 8000 and the average compensation paid per acre of wet land is Rs. 12000. This includes interest, if any, and 30% solatium.

Our survey revealed that the above amount is not at all sufficient to buy even an acre of dry land! The average cost per acre of dry land is Rs. 20300 and that of wet land is Rs. 22900. The difference between the compensation received and the current price that needs to be paid to purchase new land may have adversely affected the project-affected population.

Utilization of compensation received: The utilization pattern of compensation received reveals that the entire compensation is not invested. Some of it has gone toward repayment of previous loans, marriages of children, and conspicuous consumption. Our survey shows that only 55.6% of the total compensation has been invested. The percentage of compensation deposited with banks and other financial institutions works out to 16.3%, which means that a total 28.1% of the compensation received has been spent on consumption.

Household category	Total investment on different items	Total expenditure on different items	Total savings
Large farmers	55.51	26.35	18.14
Medium farmers	50.39	27.86	21.75
Small farmers	76.39	21.98	1.81
Marginal farmers	48.72	40.53	10.75
Agricultural labor	39.35	19.85	40.80
Others	38.41	61.59	-
Total	55.63	28.06	16.31

It may be observed that with the exception of small farmers, there is a positive relationship between the size of land holdings and the percentage of compensation invested. This goes to show that the people at the lower strata have been most affected by the displacement as most of the compensation received by them has been spent on consumption and little is left towards investment (Table – 11). A further analysis of decomposition of compensation on various individual items of investment and expenditure is given below:

• About 68% of the investment of the total investment is on agricultural lands. This does not mean that the agricultural land has been purchased to the extent of 68% of the land’s cost. The reason is that the total investment forms only about 60% of the compensation received, and therefore, investment in agricultural lands is only about 40% of the total compensation received (Table – 12). Given the fact that the current prices of land are higher than the rate of compensation, the actual average of land purchased is only 39%.

• In the case of irrigated land, 152.95 acres have been purchased subsequently as against 343.55 acres of land acquired, which works out to 44.5%. In case of non-irrigated land, the position is still worse. The land repurchased forms only 30% of the total land acquired (Table – 13). This is primarily because, as explained, the compensation received is not adequate and secondly, the entire compensation amount is not paid at one time. This has led to the creation of meager land base among the displaced.

Nature of land	Land acquired	Land subsequently purchased	Percentage of land purchased to acquired
Irrigated land	343.54	152.75	44.5
Non-irrigated land	2533.44	707.95	27.9
Total	2876.98	860.70	29.9

Similarly, compensation for certain common property resources like irrigation tanks has not been given. For example, a large tank (Hasnabad Tank) irrigating 2000 acres has become useless since the adjacent area under this tank came under submergence. The effected population’s plea for a lift irrigation scheme to make use of the water in the tank for upland areas of the surrounding villages has not been accepted by government since it thought that the cost involved is very high. Not compensating common property resources on which the poor used to depend heavily was among the foremost defects of the policy.

The settlement of project affected families as cohesive social and family units: As already mentioned, in case of Singoor Project only cash compensation method was followed and no provision was made for physical rehabilitation. Project affected persons are paid compensation for lands and structures that are affected. However, a provision is made to pay rehabilitation cash grant to the affected persons. In response to this resettlement and rehabilitation policy, some of the project-affected families have migrated to nearby villages and towns to settle themselves.

In this process, all the project-affected families from one of the affected villages (Peddareddypet) have migrated to nearby villages and as a result the whole settlement has disappeared and a majority of the project-affected families have migrated from Hunnapur, Kallapally, Belur, and Ramchandrapuram villages. This has had a devastating effect on the lives of the project-affected families and their settlements. However, in many of the villages rich the project-affected families had started settling in the upland parts around the old settlements. This clearly indicates that cash grant compensation and rehabilitation cash grant policies have not led to the formation of new settlements.

Section - III: Planning and implementing

resettlement and rehabilitation programs:

Efforts of the authorities

Resettlement of project affected families: In the backdrop of the situation described above, the Centre for Economic and Social Studies (CESS), Hyderabad, was asked to prepare a Resettlement and Rehabilitation Plan for rehabilitating the project-affected families. CESS suggested two kinds of programs for the project-affected families in order to increase or at least retain their incomes while maintaining their own identity in terms of community or village units. The programs suggested relate to resettlement and economic rehabilitation. Few revisions were made to the plan prepared by CESS and the same was approved by the Government of Andhra Pradesh.

In order to resettle the displaced families/persons as village cohesive social and family units, village sites, house plots, and the housing program, along with the infrastructure, viz., drinking water, electricity, approach and internal roads, and public buildings was suggested. The authorities have taken into account the preferences of the project affected families in identifying the village-sites for the settlement. The project-affected families were keen on retaining the identity of their respective villages in spite of the fact that much of the land has been submerged.

Further, they have shown interest to settle in the upland areas around the old villages. People belonging to the 27 fully submerged villages have decided to settle in 24 new settlements. Hence, the village sites have been identified for all the 24 new settlements either from the available government lands or through purchase of private lands in the upland parts around the old villages.

All households of erstwhile villages have settled more or less within the vicinity of their respective villages, while the households of Hunnapur (Chakriyal) village have settled at a distance of 30 kms away from their old village. The households of all the villages except those of Hunnapur have settled at a new site of their own choice. In all the 24 new settlements, a total of 3895 open plots have been made and 3490 plots for the purpose of house construction have been distributed to the eligible affected households. The allocation of house sites has been done based on the preferences of the people. The location pattern of house sites of different communities in the new village settlements resembles that of any typical Indian village.

All the poor families, irrespective of their caste affiliations, have been provided Rs. 15000 per each family as a grant to construct houses in the 24 new settlements. A total of 2255 houses have been sanctioned in the 24 settlements. Technical guidance has been provided by the engineering wing of the resettlement and rehabilitation authorities. The model of the house is decided by the people themselves. The infrastructure created in the new settlement by the resettlement and rehabilitation authorities under PRO is as follows:

• 24 primary schools, 2 secondary schools, and 2 high schools.
• Protected water supply scheme. 81 hand pumps are provided to meet the drinking water requirements.
• All the villages are connected with bus services.
• All the villages are provided with pucca approach roads and internal roads
• Electricity is available for domestic as well as for agricultural purpose in all the villages.
• These villages have 2 primary health sub-centres and 2 veterinary hospitals.

• Allotment of plots: The plot allotment made on the basis of a criterion that the person eligible for the allotment of house plots must be an awardee of a house acquired and he/she must be willing to settle in new settlements. This criterion ignored some of the households who were living for several years in the affected village but neither had land nor a house. Further, the adult member of the awardee family who are mostly married persons were deprived of the benefit of house plots. Furthermore, it was observed that the shareholders of an awardee family have not been invariably benefited. This has excluded many eligible members related to the awardee. Instead of using awardee alone as a criterion for the allotment of house plots, it might have been better if age and marital status of the member of affected family are considered for formulating the criterion for the allotment of house plots.
• Sanctioning of houses: The same anomalies that are observed in the allotment of house plots, have been committed in the sanctioning of houses to the project affected families, with the result many poor project affected families belonging to the weaker sections did not get houses. As a consequence of this lacuna, we often observed that in one house more than one family is found residing. Besides this, a large number of undeserving families have been given houses. The beneficiaries have found Rs. 15,000 as inadequate and hence they have become indebted by mobilizing additional funds to complete their house construction.
• Drinking water infrastructure: The non-execution of two water systems (hand bores and PWS schemes) simultaneously, carelessness in selecting some of the bore points, lack of proper planning in reaching operating drinking water projects and lack of people’s participation in providing infrastructure under PWS scheme have caused lot of hardship to the people for meeting drinking water as well as house construction activity. Had the authorities properly planned and implemented the drinking water infrastructure, people might not have to purchase water in summer season and go days together (in some villages), without a bath and washing clothes.
• Public Building: Staff is not posted to work in health sub-centres, veterinary centres and libraries. In some villages, teachers are also not deputed to the schools. Moreover, there are no arrangements for the maintaining these buildings.
• Approach roads: The non-laying of approach roads to the villages remained and the non-provision of adequate drinking water infrastructure prior to the initiation of housing activity caused lot of hardship to the project affected families and increased the cost of constructions of houses.

Agriculture Intensification Scheme: The production base of the villages has been severely affected due to submergence of large extent of cultivable land. The per capita availability of land has come down to 0.80 hectares from 1.82 hectares. The lands submerged were very fertile. Hence, there is a need to strengthen the production base of the villages. There is also no scope of bringing additional land under ploughing in the project affected villages. In this context, the land available in the villages after submergence has to be utilized judiciously. Productivity and the intensive use of the land have to be raised to the maximum extent possible. Irrigation could be one of the most effective instruments in this regard. Moreover, the irrigation potential created may also be used judiciously to extend irrigation facilities to the maximum possible extent of land. In this backdrop, agricultural intensification scheme has been conceived and implemented as a component of rehabilitation program.

The scheme has two components:

• Drilling and energization of borewells, and raising of horticulture crops under these borewells
• Digging of the irrigation borewells in a compact block i.e., the contiguous lands belonging to small and marginal farmers mostly from the weaker sections among the project affected families.

Village	Number of borewells drilled	Number of failed borewells	Failure rate (percentage)
Kodur	4	0	0.00
Mortaga	4	0	0.00
Maktakesaram & R.C. Puram	5	4	80.00
Garlapalli	10	6	60.00
Kallapalli-Belur	3	2	66.67
Busareddypally	14	2	14.29
Manthoor	10	1	10.00
Osrikapally	19	0	0.00
Paladugu	2	1	50.00
Raipally	3	2	66.67
Mamidipally	21	5	41.67
Doultabad	1	0	0.00
Siroor	3	0	0.00
Jangam Osrikapally	7	1	14.29
Kadirabad	3	1	33.33
Nirjapala	8	1	13.00
Indoor	4	0	0.00
Takkallapally	10	1	10.00
Allapur	8	0	0.00
Mallikarjunapally	5	1	20.00
All villages	135	28	21.00

The failure rate varies considerably across the villages. The ground water potential is varying across borewells within the village and more so across the villages (Table – 15).

Village	Ranges of water yield and number of borewells
	400- 1000	1000-1500	1500- 2000	2000- 2500	2500-3000	3000 & above	All
Doulthabad	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (100.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (100.0)
Mamidipally	0 (0.0)	1 (14.2)	3 (42.9)	3 (42.9)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	7 (199.0)
Siroor	1 (50.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (50.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	2 (100.0)
Indoor	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (33.3)	2 (66.7)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	3 (100.0)
Kodur	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (33.3)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	2 (66.7)	3 (100.0)
Mortaga	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (33.3)	2 (66.7)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	3 (100.0)
Paladugu	0 (0.0)	2 (100.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	2 (100.0)
Osrikapally	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	2 (15.3)	6 (46.2)	1 (7.7)	4 (30.8)	13 (100.0)
Nirjupla	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	3 (42.9)	4 (57.1)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	7 (100.0)
Khadirabad	1 (33.3)	1 (33.3)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (33.3)	3 (100.0)
Kallapally & Belur	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (100.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (100.0)
Busareddy Pally	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	4 (33.3)	8 (66.7)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	12 (100.0)
Allapur	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (25.0)	1 (25.0)	1 (25.0)	1 (25.0)	4 (100.0)
Mallikarjunapally	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (100.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (100.0)
Rajpally	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (100.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (100.0)
Jangam Osrikapally	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (25.0)	2 (50.0)	1 (25.0)	4 (100.0)
Thakkallapally	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (100.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (100.0)
Garlapally	0 (0.0)	1 (25.0)	1 (25.0)	0 (0.0)	2 (50.0)	0 (0.0)	4 (100.0)
M. Kesar & R. C. Puram	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	0 (0.0)	1(100.0)	0 (0.0)	1 (100.0)

The water yield of the borewells is less in the villages where the success rate of borewells is high. The water yield is decreasing over the years from the year of utilization in case of Allapur and Takkelapally villages. The actual area irrigated is very less as compared to the expected areas (Table – 16).

Village	Number of borewells commissioned	Expected irrigated area (in acres)	Actual irrigated area (in acres)
Bogumpally	-	--	--
Kodur	4	47.14	5.37
Mortaga	4	38.33	8.31
Maktakesaram & R.C. Puram	1	13.00	8.00
Garlapalli	5	35.37	17.37
Kallapalli-Belur	1	13.27	1.00
Busareddypally	10	87.20	24.20
Hunnapur	-	--	--
Manthoor	9	106.00	17.00
Osrikapally	19	103.00	33.20
Paladugu	2	12.00	--
Raipally	1	9.31	4.00
Mamidipally	8	73.12	24.32
Doultabad	2	NA	--
Siroor	2	NA	--
Peepalpally	-	--	--
Jangam Osrikapally	5	41.13	25.02
Atimal	-	--	--
Kadirabad	2	25.00	10.00
Nirjapala	7	60.05	13.37
Indoor	5	25.03	14.00
Takkallapally	10	74.09	56.00
Allapur	8	67.12	35.06
Mallikarjunapally	4	32.00	22.00
All villages	109	865.16	321.22

As against horticulture, rehabilitation and resettlement authorities anticipated that the project-affected families would plant crops that are water saving, but they began cultivating water intensive crops like paddy, sugarcane, onion, and wheat. Incidentally, in case of successful borewells, the income per acre increased by about Rs. 1200 to 1600.

The above discussion clearly indicates that the community irrigation borewells scheme has its limitations in serving as a strategy to strengthen the agriculture production base of the villages. This program has to be implemented with the open dug well scheme located as a part of the watershed management program.

Self-employment programs: Have been implemented for the benefit of the poor among the project-affected families. The schemes implemented under the self-employment programs can be grouped in three categories:

• Agriculture: cat and bullocks and plough bullocks.
• Animal husbandry: Sheep units and milch animals.
• Industry, service and business: Kirana shops, mobile cloth units, cycle taxi, flour mills, carpentry, and air compressor.

• Both the components of the agricultural scheme (cart and plough bullocks) have not been grounded simultaneously.
• A total of 28 beneficiaries have retained their assets.
• The non-retention of assets has been dominant in the case of sheep and kirana units. The reasons for non-retention of assets is on account of disposing off the assets to meet personal needs, defective assets and grounding of schemes when the beneficiaries are in a transitory stage of settlement. Further, lack of effective backward and forward linkages also led to the disposal of assets.
• There is no constant monitoring of the schemes after they are grounded.
• Large areas of the submerged lands could be utilized when waters recede and this can be used as common property resource of the village. Here, the poor can be given usufruct rights for growing fuel and fodder crops. This could provide an effective backward linkage for the animal husbandry sector schemes. But, no efforts have been initiated in this regard.

Self-employment training and asset distribution: One of the reasons for the existence of unemployment and poverty among the Singoor Project affected is that many of them do not possess skills. Hence, at least, some of the people can be imparted training to acquire necessary skills in certain trades. Subsequently, appropriate assets can be provided to them to take up self-employment activity in their respective trades. Under such a program, 90 persons were trained in various trades. But all the trainees have not been provided with assets related to their trade after the successful completion of the training. Overall, this scheme was not properly planned.

Matchbox industry: Keeping in view the fact that the nature of the agricultural economy of the project affected area did not provide for any non-farm activities, the authorities made an attempt to open up wage employment opportunities by establishing match box making industries in the project affected villages. ITC Limited, one of the largest companies in India stepped forward to render their services for imparting technical know-how and marketing the product. The authorities first proposed eight production centers (Raipally, Mamidipally, Khadirabad, Kallapally-Belur, Manthoor, Indoor, Osrikapally and Mallikarjuna-pally) and later decided to confine the matchbox making industry to two locations (Raipally and Mamidipally) as ITC had withdrawn its support.

The unit at Raipally was started initially so as to acquire experience in organizing the other unit. Women from Raipally, Siroor and Jangam Osrikapally were imparted training to acquire skills in participatory matchbox making. This matchbox making industry is being run on a cooperative basis, making reasonable profits and providing employment to female workers from the above three villages in the agricultural off-season. As a matter of fact, alternative employment in the agricultural off-season is a t zero-level in these villages prior to the establishment of this unit.

Moreover, women belonging to the Muslim community who were idle earlier, could utilize the opportunity by working from their houses and yet earn a minimum of Rs. 5 per day. Women working full time are able to earn Rs. 10 to Rs. 13 a day. Incidentally, these earnings are substantial for their families. This may lead to tightening of the labor market in Raipally and surrounding villages in the years to come if nothing else comes up.

Section – IV: Rehabilitation and NGO involvement

As various resettlement programs in the project affected villages, outlined in the earlier section, had been completed, the need for comprehensive economic rehabilitation schemes for project affected families who are below the poverty line has been increasingly felt. Economic rehabilitation is all the more necessary to restore the economic status of the vulnerable project affected families to the level they were prior to submergence of their land, their main productive asset. The authorities also realized that if proper economic rehabilitation was not undertaken, there is a likelihood that these families would migrate in search of gainful employment.

Further, it was realized that the experience of self-employment programs, implemented on a limited scale, was not encouraging. Even where few schemes were grounded, it was observed that there were loose ends in formulation and implementation. A comprehensive basic households survey was also not carried out by the resettlement and rehabilitation authorities. In a few villages where it was carried out, it was not done systematically. This has resulted in non-retention/under utilization of assets due to lack of effective backward and forward linkages. As mentioned earlier, planning was not done in assessing the demand potential of various schemes based on skill profiles of beneficiaries. This resulted in significant leakages.

To correct these distortions, it was felt necessary to entrust the task of preparing comprehensive village economic rehabilitation plan for each village to non-government organizations (NGOs). Another factor that weighed in favor of this decision was the fact that NGOs have demonstrated a greater sensitivity to complex social dimensions of rehabilitation and resettlement than the authorities who take a casual approach to social problems. Against this background, the authorities invited four NGOs working in the region and entrusted preparation of comprehensive economic rehabilitation plans for 20 villages. In addition to the NGOs, a research centre (CESS) was entrusted two villages while the authorities’ Rehabilitation Division by itself would handle three villages. Table – 17 gives the details.

Organization	Villages entrusted
Deccan Development Society (DDS)	Mortaga, Mamidipally, Bogulampally, Siroor, Peepalapally, and Itikapally.
Youth for Action (YFA)	Manthoor, Atimayal, Indoor, Kodur, Kadirabad, Kalleapally, and Bellur.
Advancement of Rural Technology, Hyderabad Input Centre (ARTHIC)	Allapur, Takallapally, Mallikarjunapally, Busareddypally, Makatekasaram, Ramachandrapuram, and Garlapally.
Professionals for Development Action (PRERENA)	Osrikapally, and Nirjapally.
Centre for Economic & Social Studies (CESS)	Jangam Osrikapally, and Paladugu.
Rehabilitation Division	Doulatabad, Hunnapur, and Raipally.

Methodology adopted: A common methodology adopted for the preparation of village rehabilitation plans was worked out by the NGOs/others after a series of discussions with the rehabilitation and resettlement authorities. Primarily, NGOs have used participatory rural appraisal techniques to understand the existing situation in the villages to get first-hand knowledge of physical and human resources. Besides this, detailed discussions with different communities by forming groups was undertaken to understand the main occupation, skills and asset base of project affected families.

Subsequently, the details regarding ways and means of rehabilitating them were elicited. Community-wise meetings were organized as it was felt that in the general body meeting of the village, only the views and choices of the dominant sections are voiced. The dispossessed castes and classes hardly make their demands felt and are usually docile during the deliberations. Hence, community-wise discussions are found extremely useful as the project affected families express their preference in an uninhibited manner. In view of this, such meetings were held more frequently than general body meetings. After several rounds of discussions between the authorities and the NGOs, the following criteria was adopted to identify the awardee families who are eligible for economic rehabilitation:

• Land possessed (non-irrigated) must be five acres and below.
• Annual household income consisting of five members from all sources must be Rs. 8500 and below relating to the year 1992-93.

Market surveys have been conducted by all the NGOs to ascertain the demand potential of various schemes proposed in the plans. On the whole, the process of preparation of village plans is primarily participatory in nature involving the project-affected families at every stage. It may also be mentioned here that it took a fairly long time for the NGOs to complete the task. Initially, NGO personnel stayed in the villages for considerably long periods to build rapport with the project affected families. Then, a long time was spent in checking and rechecking the preferences of project affected families taking into consideration their skills and capabilities.

Schemes proposed by the NGOs: A brief discussion of the schemes proposed by the NGOs for the project affected families is presented below:

Purchase of land for the landless: In the initial stages of the planning process, this scheme was not seriously considered and at one stage the resettlement and rehabilitation authorities were against the NGOs proposing this scheme. However, the NGOs were able to convince the authorities of the need for proposing the land purchase scheme and its viability in the context of the depleted land base of the project affected families in predominantly agrarian societies. Further, it was argued that land purchase scheme is the best as the experience of the schemes implemented so far under various anti-poverty programs was not found to be encouraging. In particular, purchase of land was proposed for Scheduled Caste (SC) households, who are basically landless. However, some sections belonging to Backward Class (BC) have also opted for this scheme.

Since rehabilitation cash grant to each awardee household was fixed at Rs. 8000 uniformly, purchasing land for that meager amount became quite difficult for the NGOs. As a part of mobilizing additional resources, DRDA (District Rural Development Agency) was approached. DRDA came forward to grant Rs. 6000 for each SC household. However, this facility for BCs and other households could not be availed, as this was not permitted under DRDA guidelines. Through such concerted efforts, NGOs were able to buy considerable amount of land in various villages for SC and BC project affected families.

Agriculture related schemes: A number of project affected families have opted for plough bullocks, and cart and bullocks scheme in the plans prepared by the NGOs in view of the fact that land would not be under submergence for a major part of the year and hence could be cultivated.

Animal husbandry schemes: In a backward district like Medak, the rearing of buffaloes and cows is not a usual practice in the countryside. Because of a subsistence economy, the rural population cannot afford to maintain these animals which depend on a large amount of feed and fodder. In contrast to this reality, the authorities insisted that the NGOs should propose crossbred varieties because of their high milk yielding potential. Even among the NGOs, there was no consensus. But sheep and goat schemes were basically suggested for Golla/Kurma (shepherd) communities only as the rearing of these animals is their traditional occupation. At the instance of NGOs, the authorities have initiated efforts to provide the poor access to offshore lands for raising fodder and fuel crops. In other words, usufruct rights to the poor on these lands for their betterment.

Industry, service and business schemes: Schemes like petty trade, provision stores, grain business, etc., were proposed keeping two important things in mind:

• Project affected families opting for these schemes possessed skills in managing such businesses.
• Proper backward and forward linkages had been established to make such schemes viable.

Non-farm activities: Have not received enough attention in NGO plan exercises due to the subsistence agricultural economies prevalent in project affected villages. Although certain resources are found in these villages, it was observed that setting up industries was beyond the capacity of project affected families. Even starting a small industry on group basis was found to be difficult due to lack of resources and skills. Hence, it was proposed that non-resource based industries can be promoted outside the rehabilitation and resettlement plan by way of generous bank loans to entrepreneurs who would provide employment to project affected families on a sustained basis.

Formation of support institutions: All the NGOs, besides proposing various schemes, added the need for forming support institutions like women sanghas (groups), thrift and credit societies, etc. The starting of these support institutions, the NGOs felt, would go a long way in ensuring benefits in a sustained way from the proposed schemes.

Constraints: The constraints faced by NGOs in the planning process is with regard to the uniform cash grant given to the eligible project affected families for purchase of productive assets. The NGOs felt that the cash grant of Rs. 8000 fixed for each awardee should have been placed at their disposal. This would have allowed reasonable flexibility on the part of NGOs in planning schemes in a more meaningful manner. This is because of the fact that a good number of schemes opted for by the beneficiaries did not require the whole sum while some others required more. NGOs were of the view that more number of project affected families could have benefited with the same amount of money, used differently.

Implementation process: NGO experience: A total of 3508 schemes have been grounded in 24 villages of which 1321 are in the agricultural sector, 1125 in animal husbandry, 486 in industry, service and business. In addition, 576 bank deposits under social security scheme have also been grounded. The details are given in Table – 18.

NGOs have faced certain difficulties in the implementation process vis-à-vis the role of the resettlement and rehabilitation authorities. While NGOs were given a relatively free hand in the preparation of plans, the same kind of autonomy was not witnessed during the implementation phase. This often resulted in some friction between the NGOs and the authorities. In some villages, this resulted in inordinate delays. The required level of cooperation from officials (particularly those at the grassroots) was lacking and this had considerable repercussions.

Although purchasing committees were constituted comprising awardees, officials and NGO representatives, the officials on many occasions rejected the awardee’s choice related to the purchase of the asset. On many occasions purchases were cancelled due to such problems. In animal husbandry schemes, it was felt that places of purchase of assets were thrust upon awardees. Project affected families were taken to places as far as 500 kms away, suffering much hardship. True, some awardees were involved in fictitious purchases in the early stages of the scheme’s implementation. But shifting purchases to such far off destinations was unwarranted. NGOs did not have much say to change the course of events.

NGO experimentation with some animal husbandry schemes met with failure. For example one NGO proposed and grounded Jersey cow scheme for some of the awardees. This was done despite the reluctance of the beneficiaries. The concerned NGO only bothered about the high milk yield of these cows but did not realize that the beneficiaries had no experience of rearing and milking these cows. Besides, there was no demand for cow milk even from hoteliers. As a result, a number of these cows died as the beneficiaries failed to neither provide adequate feed nor evince interest in their maintenance. The few cows that survived neglect became unproductive.

One more lacuna that affected overall efficiency of the economic rehabilitation program is that the presence of NGOs was not ensured for adequate periods in the respective villages so that the schemes grounded are sustained in a concrete way. Since the NGOs were retained for a short period, sustained monitoring of schemes was not possible. This led to undesirable consequences in some villages. It was widely felt that in order to make any economic rehabilitation package sustainable on a long-term basis, the presence of NGOs for a reasonable period of time (say, two or three years) must be a necessary precondition.

NGOs should not depend on the government machinery for providing healthcare services to animals. This observation emerges out of the fact that a lot of casualties occurred in animals in the absence of provision of proper healthcare services for animals by the government in the new settlements. Therefore, NGOs should have made arrangements for proper veterinary staff.

Section – V: Lessons from the Singoor experience

The foregoing analysis has focused basically on the examination of three broad and crucial issues with regard to the Singoor Project:

• The scope and limitations of the cash grant compensation policy.
• The effectiveness of the resettlement and rehabilitation program.
• The involvement of appropriate agencies in the resettlement and rehabilitation program.

Common property resources that have links with private property resources and which serve as fallback resources for the poor have also not been compensated. Another set of people who have been left out of the policy for compensation are the agricultural laborers, the worst affected lot among the project affected families as the lands that provided them a livelihood have been submerged. The exclusion of the most vulnerable project affected families and assets from the purview of the compensation package can be located in the flaws embodied in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In short, this Act is the basic culprit.

The valuation of assets acquired is a critical issue. The experience of the Singoor Project reveals that while the project affected families are comfortable with the valuation of structures, but the same is not true for land. Market value has not been considered for valuation. The authorities chose to consider the recorded values of land transactions. This value is invariably lower as the general tendency in land transactions is to register at low value to avoid higher stamp duty. Instead of this method, had the authorities approached the Lok Adalat, project affected families would have been spared the trouble and expense of approaching courts for higher compensation.

What is significant is the fact that the compensation was inadequate to purchase equivalent assets. Added to that, the compensation amount was not paid in a single installment. Such an arrangement tempted beneficiaries to spend the compensation amount on non-productive things, further depriving them of the ability to purchase land. Small and marginal farmers were the worst hit by such an arrangement. This phenomenon reinforces the right to question the basic assumption of the cash grant compensation policy that the project affected families can repurchase assets to the extent they have lost with the compensation amount!

What is more, the cash grant compensation policy and the rehabilitation cash grant does not enable the project-affected families to settle as cohesive social, family and village units. This is evident from the migration pattern of project affected families in large numbers from evacuated villages to resettle in nearby villages and towns. This is because of the absence of a clear-cut resettlement policy. Had the authorities announced in advance that besides cash grant compensation, villages will be resettled in new settlements with important amenities, disappearance of some villagers would not have occurred. The intervention of authorities to resettle the displaced succeeds to the extent they are able to keep a majority of the people in the new settlement.

The pitfalls in the planning and implementation process extend to the economic rehabilitation program equally. However, the involvement of NGOs has improved the process substantially. But, had the authorities given the NGOs more freedom, the economic rehabilitation program may have been much more effective and would have had a wider reach. It would have certainly mitigated the hardships faced by the projected affected families to a considerable extent. While NGO involvement led to purchase of land being considered especially for the more vulnerable landless sections, the effort to purchase land itself in the vicinity met with little success. Land was either not available, or too expensive. Naturally, project affected families were unwilling to purchase lands that are far away from their settlements as the cultivation of these lands is not a viable proposition.

These issues highlight some limitations of resettlement and rehabilitation policy. Overall, some fundamental questions need to be answered: Can project affect families be resettled in new settlements without losing assets what they actually had? Can project affected families be moved to places without a concern for settling them as cohesive social, family and village units? Answering these questions effectively would, it is hoped, lead to more enlightened conception and implementation of resettlement and rehabilitation policies in the future.

Authors

S. Galab and M. Gopinath Reddy are members of faculty, Centre for Economic & Social Studies (CESS), Hyderabad.

References